This paper presents simpler specifications of more complex variants of the Paxos algorithm for distributed consensus, as a case study of high-level specification of distributed algorithms. The development of the specifications uses a method and language for expressing complex control flows and synchronization conditions precisely at a high level.
Introduction
Distributed algorithms are increasingly important as distributed applications are increasingly developed. At the same time, distributed algorithms are often difficult to understand, even if they might appear simple. The most important and well-known of such algorithms is Paxos [Lam98, Lam01, vRA15] for distributed consensus-a set of distributed processes trying to agree on a single value or a continuing sequence of values, called single-value consensus or multi-value consensus, respectively.
Since Paxos was first developed by Lamport [Lam98, Lam17] , there has been a long series of studies of it, from optimizations and extensions, especially for use in practical systems, e.g., [Bur06, CGR07] , to more variations and expositions, especially with effort for better understanding, e.g., [DPLL00, Lam01, OO14, vRSS15] , and for formal verification, e.g., [WWP + 15, WWA + 16, CLS16] . This series has finally come to a better comprehensive understanding of Paxos, as presented in Paxos Made Moderately Complex by van Renesse and Altinbuken [vRA15] , starting from its simpler core, as presented in Paxos Made Simple by Lamport [Lam01] .
This paper presents simpler specifications of more complex variants of the Paxos algorithm for distributed consensus, as a case study of high-level specification of distributed algorithms. The development of the specifications uses a method and language for expressing complex control flows
• We show that the resulting specifications can be formally verified using a proof system, with proofs an order of magnitude smaller than prior proofs, and allowing us to detect and fix a subtle safety violation that was unknown in an early specification.
Our specifications are executable in DistAlgo [Dis16] , an extension of the Python programming language. Our proofs are mechanically checked using TLAPS [Mic15] , a proof system for TLA+, Lamport's Temporal Logic of Actions [Lam02] . Our specifications in DistAlgo and proofs in TLAPS are available at darlab.cs.stonybrook.edu/paxos. There have been continuous studies of specification and verification of distributed algorithms, especially of Paxos, as discussed in Section 6. However, with the exception of vRA Multi-Paxos, no previous published papers present complete precise specification of Multi-Paxos. Previous formal specifications are only for Basic Paxos or are too long or too complicated to present in papers and, to the best of our knowledge, no previous efforts of proofs for those specifications reported finding any correctness violations.
Basic Paxos and high-level specification
We describe our language and method of specification using Basic Paxos as an example.
Basic Paxos
Figure 1 shows Lamport's description of Basic Paxos [Lam01] . It discusses the algorithm for (1) the proposer and acceptor-the two phases, and (2) the learner-the obvious algorithm.
High-level specification
From the description of Basic Paxos, one can see that high-level specification of distributed algorithms needs four main components:
Distributed processes that can send messages. In Figure 1 , there are proposer, acceptor, and learner processes, prepare and accept messages from a proposer to an acceptor, response messages back from an acceptor, and messages for accepted proposals from an acceptor to a learner.
Putting the actions of the proposer and acceptor together, we see that the algorithm operates in the following two phases.
Phase 1. (a) A proposer selects a proposal number n and sends a prepare request with number n to a majority of acceptors.
(b) If an acceptor receives a prepare request with number n greater than that of any prepare request to which it has already responded, then it responds to the request with a promise not to accept any more proposals numbered less than n and with the highestnumbered proposal (if any) that it has accepted.
Phase 2. (a) If the proposer receives a response to its prepare requests (numbered n) from a majority of acceptors, then it sends an accept request to each of those acceptors for a proposal numbered n with a value v, where v is the value of the highest-numbered proposal among the responses, or is any value if the responses reported no proposals.
(b) If an acceptor receives an accept request for a proposal numbered n, it accepts the proposal unless it has already responded to a prepare request having a number greater than n.
To learn that a value has been chosen, a learner must find out that a proposal has been accepted by a majority of acceptors. The obvious algorithm is to have each acceptor, whenever it accepts a proposal, respond to all learners, sending them the proposal. ... Control flows for handling received messages. In Figure 1 , messages can be received by acceptors, by proposers, and by learners asynchronously at any time, but processes must synchronize by testing and waiting for different conditions on the received messages. Capturing such complex control flows is the most difficult part. High-level queries for synchronization conditions. In Figure 1 , the conditions for Phases 1b, 2a, 2b, and learner before taking actions involve sets of many messages sent and received.
Capturing such conditions at a high-level is essential to making control flows much clearer and easier to understand. Configuration for setting up and running. This is often implicit in descriptions of distributed algorithms. In Figure 1 , each process needs to be set up and get a hold of other processes with which it needs to communicate. In general, there may also be special configuration requirements, such as use of reliable communication channels. Figure 2 shows a high-level specification of Basic Paxos in DistAlgo, explained below. Figure 1 corresponds to the body of run in Proposer, the two receive definitions in Acceptor, and the condition of await in Learner, 20 lines total, including selecting a proposal number, in Phase 1a, to be self, and taking any value, in Phase 2a, to be an integer in the range of 1..100. The rest, 18 lines total, shows how to set up processes, start to run them, and output the result.
Besides the language constructs explained below, we use commonly used notations in high-level languages for no operation (pass), assignments (v := e), etc. We use indentation for scoping, ':' for separation, and '#' for comments. Distributed processes that can send messages A type P of distributed processes can be defined by process P : body, e.g., lines 1-14 in Figure 2 . Control flow for handling received messages Received messages can be handled both asynchronously, using yield points and receive definitions, and synchronously, using await statements.
• A yield point, --l, with optional label l, specifies a point where control flow can yield to handling of un-handled messages and resume afterward. There is an implicit yield point, if not an explicit one, before each await statement, e.g., line 8, for handling messages while waiting.
• A definition, receive m from p at l1,...,lj : body, handles, at yield points l1, ..., lj, un-handled messages that match m from p, e.g., lines 18-22. The from and at clauses are optional.
• A statement, await cond1: stmt1 or ... or cond k : stmt k timeout t: stmt, waits for one of cond1, ..., cond k to be true or a timeout after period t, and then nondeterministically selects one of stmt1, ..., stmt k , stmt whose conditions are true to execute, e.g., lines 8-14. Each branch is optional. So is the statement in await with a single branch.
High-level queries for synchronization conditions High-level queries can be used over message histories, and patterns can be used for matching the messages.
• Histories of messages sent and received by a process are kept in sent and received, respectively. sent is updated at each send statement, by adding each message sent. received is updated at the next yield point if there are un-handled messages, by adding un-handled messages before executing any matching receive definitions. Expression sent m to p is equivalent to m to p in sent. It returns true iff a message that matches m to p is in sent. The to clause is optional. received m from p is similar.
• A pattern can be used to match a message, in sent and received, and by a receive definition. A constant value, such as 'response', or a previously bound variable, indicated with prefix =, in the pattern must match the corresponding components of the message. An underscore matches anything. Previously unbound variables in the pattern are bound to the corresponding components in the matched message. For example, received ('response',=n,_) from a on line 8 matches every triple in received whose first two components are 'response' and the value of n, and binds a to the sender.
A query can be a comprehension, aggregation, or quantification over sets or sequences.
• A comprehension, {e: v1 in s1, ..., v k in s k , cond}, where vi can be a pattern, returns the set of values of e for all combinations of values of variables that satisfy all vi in si clauses and condition cond, e.g., the comprehension on line 8.
• An aggregation, agg s, where agg is an aggregation operator such as count or max, returns the value of applying agg to the set value of s, e.g., the count query on line 8.
• An existential quantification, some v1 in s1, ..., v k in s k has cond, returns true iff for some combinations of values of variables that satisfy all vi in si clauses, cond holds, e.g., the some query on line 24. When the query returns true, all variables in the query are also bound to a combination of satisfying values, called a witness, e.g., n and v on lines 29-31.
• A universal quantification, each v1 in s1, ..., v k in s k has cond, returns true iff for all combinations of values of variables that satisfy all vi in si clauses, cond holds, e.g., the each query on line 19.
Other operations on sets can also be used, in particular:
any s returns any element of set s if s is not empty, or a special value undefined otherwise. n1..n2 returns the set of integers ranging from n1 to n2 for n1 ≤ n2. s1 + s2 returns the union of sets s1 and s2. s1 or s2 returns s1 if s1 is not empty, or s2 otherwise.
Precise understanding of Basic Paxos
We can now precisely follow Phases 1a and 1b and Phases 2a and 2b in Figure 2 , and see how it exactly follows Lamport's description in Figure 1 .
Phase 1a (lines 6-7) is simple, straightforwardly following the description in Figure 1 .
In Phase 1b (lines 18-22), when an acceptor receives a prepare with a proposal number larger than all numbers in its previous responses, it responds with this proposal number and with the accepted (n,v) where n is maximum among all accepted it has sent; note if it has not sent any accepted, undefined is in the response instead of some (n,v).
In Phase 2a (lines 8-14), when a proposer receives responses to its proposal number n from a majority of acceptors, it takes v in the (n2,v) that has the maximum n2 in all responses to n, or any value in 1..100 if the responses have no (n2,v) pairs but only undefined; note in the latter case, the set on lines 10-11 is empty because undefined does not match (n2,v). The proposer then sends accept for a proposal with number n and value v to acceptors that responded to n.
Phase 2b (23-25) is also simple, directly following the description in Figure 1 .
In particular, the specification in Figure 2 helps make the "promise" in Phase 1b of Figure 1 precisethe "promise" refers to what are to be accepted later in Phase 2b. Indeed, this is the hardest part for understanding Paxos, because understanding an earlier phase requires understanding a later phase, which requires understanding the earlier phases. The key idea is that the later phase to be understood is for a smaller (or equal 1 ) proposal number, and the later phase for before the smallest proposal number needs to provide nothing, i.e., provide only undefined.
We can see that the use of high-level control flows and high-level queries allow our Basic Paxos specification to be at the same high level as Lamport's English description, while making everything completely precise. With also precise support for setting up and running, the complete specification is both directly executable, by automatic compilation to a language like Python, and ready to be verified, by translation to a language like TLA+.
Configuration for setting up and running Configuration for requirements such as reliable channels and logical clocks can be specified in a main definition, e.g., lines 33-38. Basic Paxos does not have special configuration requirements, besides setting up and running the processes by calling new, setup, and start as already described. In general, new can have an additional clause at node specifying remote nodes where the created processes will run; the default is the local node.
3 Multi-Paxos with preemption and reconfiguration, and improved specification
Multi-Paxos extends Basic Paxos to reach consensus on a continuing sequence of values, instead of a single value. It is significantly more sophisticated than running Basic Paxos for each slot in the sequence, because proposals must be made continuously for each next slot, with the proposal number, also called ballot number or simply ballot, incremented repeatedly in new rounds if needed, and the ballot is shared for all the slots for obvious efficiency reasons. Preemption allows a proposer, also called leader, to be preempted by another leader that has a larger ballot. That is, if a leader receives a message with a larger ballot than its own ballot, it abandons its own ballot, and starts a larger ballot later.
Reconfiguration allows a set of new leaders to be used during the execution of the algorithm. The slot in which the change of leaders is to happen must be agreed on by the old leaders. This is done by taking the change as one of the values, also called commands, to be agreed on.
We describe a simplified specification of Multi-Paxos with preemption and reconfiguration, which has also allowed us to cleanly remove an unnecessary delay and easily discover a main liveness violation. or new:
vRA Multi-Paxos pseudocode
vRA Multi-Paxos Replica slot request response propose decision preempt A Replica process keeps the state of an application, e.g., a bank. It continuously receives requested commands ('request') from clients, and sends proposed slots for the commands ('propose') to leaders; it also receives decisions about slots for the commands ('decision') from leaders, applies the operations in the commands to the state, and sends the results ('response') to the clients. A slot is just a component in a proposal or decision in Leader and Acceptor, but is realized in Replica as 'slot_in', for the next slot to send a proposal, and 'slot_out', for the next slot to apply a decision; a window between these two is used so that a decided reconfiguration takes effect at the slot at the end of the window, and other commands can still be proposed and decided within the window while the reconfiguration proposal is being considered. A command is a triple of client id, command id, and operation, and the operation for reconfiguration holds the set of new leaders. 
Simplified specification
Figure 3 shows a simplified high-level specification of vRA Multi-Paxos. It corresponds to over 100 lines of pseudocode and over 300 lines of Python (that runs only threads for processes, not distributed processes over networks) in [vRA15] . The simplifications and new organizations are as follows.
Scout and Commander are removed, their main roles for the two phases are merged into Leader, and their roles for determining preemption are merged into Acceptor. Leader uses two count queries (lines 27 and 34), instead of repeated updates of two waitfor sets in Scout and Commander, to collect majority votes from Phases 1b and 2b; uses two queries to collect previously accepted and newly proposed proposals (lines 28 and 31) instead of updating a proposals set; and uses two simple queries for preemption (lines 36 and 37 Note that the set of accepted triples is a superset of the set sent in the original pseudocode; the latter cannot be defined as a function of received. Also note that determining and replying with preemption in our specification is more efficient than always replying as normal to a scout or commander in the original pseudocode, especially by omitting the set of accepted triples for Phase 1b, because the set is large and is ignored by the leader anyway. Replica uses two clearly separated conditions, one for proposing commands based on requests, one for applying commands based on decisions, instead of keeping and updating requests, proposals, and decisions in sophisticated control flows.
Unnecessary delay, liveness violation, and fixes
Specification of Replica is arguably the most complex among all types of processes in vRA MultiPaxos, due to the need of mediation between clients and leaders, while supporting also consensus for change of leaders upon reconfiguration. Our effort to create a high-level specification of Replica allowed us to notice and fix an unnecessary delay in processing requests. Note that our first await condition allows any received request, for which all sent proposals for a slot have that slot taken by a different command in received decisions, to be detected immediately. The original pseudocode delays the detection until slot_out equals the taken slot.
Our high-level specification also allowed us to discover a main violation of liveness in the original pseudocode: if there is no decision made for a slot, e.g., due to lost propose messages from all replicas proposing for that slot, all replicas will stop applying decisions from that slot on, so slot_out will stop incrementing; furthermore, due to the limited WINDOW used for incrementing slot_in, all sending of proposals will stop after the WINDOW is used up. So all replicas will be completely stuck, and the entire system will stop making progress. A fix could be to propose for that slot again after a timeout. The leader can work on deciding for that slot if a decision for it has not been made; otherwise, it can send back the decision for that slot.
Note that the liveness violation must be fixed, because the propose messages are internal to the vRA Multi-Paxos mechanism and may be lost even if no processes fail. The unnecessary delay may look minor, but realizing it and removing it also helped us develop our simpler specification than the original pseudocode, especially in terms of control flows, which subsequently allowed us to easily discover the liveness violation.
Both problems in Replica are difficult to detect in the original pseudocode due to complex control flows. Developing higher-level specifications, especially using nondeterministic await with high-level synchronization conditions, helped us understand the algorithm better and discover these problems easily.
Further optimizations and merging processes
High-level specifications also allow additional optimizations and extensions to be done more easily. We describe the two most important ones suggested for vRA Multi-Paxos [vRA15] , and discuss a general method for merging processes that supports a range of additional optimizations.
State reduction
The most serious efficiency problem of the algorithm in Figure 3 is the fast growing set accepted, which quickly chokes any execution of the algorithm that does real message passing. The solution is to not keep all triples received in 2a messages, as in Figure 3 , or those that have the maximum ballot when the triple was received in a 2a message, as in the original pseudocode [vRA15] , but keep only triples with the maximum ballot for each slot, so there is at most one triple for each slot. This is done by changing line 46 to This drastically reduces not only the state space of acceptors, but also leaders, which receive messages containing accepted.
Failure detection
Failure detection addresses the next most serious problem: leaders compete unnecessarily to become the leader with the highest ballot, leaving little or no time for proposals to be decided. Adding failure detection uses ping-pong after preemption: in Leader, after exiting the outer await following preemption and before incrementing ballot, periodically ping the leader leader2 that has the larger round number r2 in the ballot and wait for replies, by inserting 37.1 while each sent('ping',=r2,t) to =leader2 has received ('pong',r2,t) from leader2: 37.2 send ('ping', r2, logical_time()) to leader2 37.3 await timeout TIMEOUT
and adding the following receive definition after the run definition:
38.1 receive ('ping', r2, t) from leader2: 38.2 send ('pong', r2, t) to leader2
Merging processes
High-level specifications in DistAlgo allow different types of processes that run at the same time to be merged easily, even if they interact with each other in sophisticated ways, provided they together have one main flow of control. There are two cases:
1. A process P that has only await false in run can be merged easily with any process Q. For example, for vRA Multi-Paxos in Figure 3 , Acceptor can be merged with Leader by adding the receive definitions of Acceptor to the body of Leader. Process setups can be transformed accordingly. Details are omitted because they are less important. These transformations are easy to automate. Inversely, independent receive definitions can be easily put into separate processes. For vRA Multi-Paxos in Figure 3 , all three types of processes, or any two of them, can be merged, giving a total of 4 possible merged specifications. Merging supports colocation of processes cleanly, and allows a range of optimizations, e.g., garbage collection of states of leaders and acceptors, for decided slots already learned by all replicas [vRA15] . Furthermore, communication between processes that are merged no longer needs real message passing but can be done more efficiently through shared memory. Also, because the actions are independent, lightweight threads can be used to make each process more efficient.
A process
With a few more small variations to vRA Multi-Paxos, merging Replica, Leader, and Acceptor into one process type yields essentially the 'Replica' in Chubby [Bur06], Google's distributed lock service that uses Paxos, and the 'Server' in Raft [OO14] , a pseudocode for the main features of Chubby. In general, separate processes provide modularity, and merged processes provide efficiency. Being able to merge separate processes easily allows one to obtain the benefits of both.
Complete executable specification
A main definition can set up a number of Replica, Leader, and Acceptor processes, or their merged versions, and some Client processes that send request messages to Replica processes and receive response messages, and define parameters WINDOW and TIMEOUT. We summarize the results of running DistAlgo specifications:
• DistAlgo specifications can be run directly. For example, a complete specification of vRA Multi-Paxos with state reduction and failure detection in file spec.da (available at darlab.cs.stonybrook.edu/ can be run directly with Python (3.5 or higher), by executing the commands pip install pyDistAlgo followed by python -m da spec.da.
• vRA Multi-Paxos as in Figure 3 , without the state reduction in Section 4.1, almost immediately overflows the default message buffer size of 4KB, yielding Could not send message due to:MessageTooBigException('** Outgoing message object too big to fit in buffer, dropped.')
• vRA Multi-Paxos with state reduction, without the failure detection in Section 4.2, runs continuously but most times stops making progress for 3 leaders, 3 acceptors, and 3 replicas, serving 10 client requests, and was killed after 200 rounds (200-600 ballots) have been attempted.
• vRA Multi-Paxos with both state reduction and failure detection runs smoothly. For example, setting up 10 processes (3 leaders, 3 acceptors, 3 replicas, and 1 client) and processing 10 requests takes 84.117 milliseconds (ranging from 70.158 to 96.903), averaged over 10 runs, on a Intel Core i7-6650U CPU @ 2.20GHz with 16 GB RAM, running Windows 10 and Python 3.5.
Many additional optimizations and experiments could be carried out though they are beyond the scope of this paper. Our experience is that precise high-level specifications and optimizations, formally verified as discussed next, allow us to understand the algorithms much better and to significantly improve efficiency as well as correctness much more easily than possible before.
Correctness and formal verification
The delay and liveness problems discovered for Replica in vRA Multi-Paxos do not affect the safety of vRA Multi-Paxos. However, even the safety is not easy to understand. We have developed formal proofs of safety of the complete specification of vRA Multi-Paxos in Figure 3 , and of the one extended with state reduction and the one further extended with failure detection as described in Section 4. The safety property ensures that, for each slot, only a single command may be decided and it must be one of the commands proposed.
The proofs are done by first translating the specifications into TLA+; this is currently done manually, but an automatic translator is being developed. The high-level nature of our specifications makes the translation simple in principle: each type of data in DistAlgo corresponds a type of data in TLA+, and each expression and statement in DistAlgo corresponds to a conjunction of equations in TLA+. The three specifications in TLA+ are 154, 157, and 217 lines.
Proofs in TLAPS
The proofs in TLAPS are 4959, 5005, and 7006 lines, respectively. The proofs are much more complex and longer than the previous proof of 1033 lines for Multi-Paxos with preemption [CLS16] , because of the additional details captured in vRA Multi-Paxos, and the extensions for state reduction and failure detection. Appendix A contains additional details about our mechanically checked proofs.
Compared to the other existing mechanically checked proofs for Multi-Paxos and variants, namely, a proof of Multi-Paxos in Dafny from the IronFleet project [HHK + 15] and a proof of Raft in Coq from the Verdi project [WWA + 16], our proofs in TLAPS are an order of magnitude smaller, as summarized in Section 6. We believe that this is at least partly due to the fact that we started with higher-level specifications that are simpler. The shorter proofs are not only much easier to understand and maintain, but also much easier and faster to check automatically. Both are significant advantages for practical development cycles of specifications, programs, and proofs.
Our longest proof checking time, for our largest proof in TLAPS, is 13 minutes, as shown in Appendix A. No proof checking time is reported for the proof from Verdi [WWA + 16], but we were able to run proof check for the proof after solving some version mismatch problems, and it took 29 minutes to run on the same machine as our proof. The proof checking times for the proofs from IronFleet are reported to be 147 minutes for the protocol-level proof and 312 minutes including also the implementation-level proof [HHK + 15]; we have not been able to run proof check for their proofs on our machine due to an error from a build file.
Safety violation and fix
Our development of formal proofs also allowed us to discover and fix a safety violation in an earlier version of our specification for vRA Multi-Paxos, where acceptors always reply with 1b and 2b messages, not preempt messages, as in the original pseudocode, and leaders try to detect preemption. It is incorrect because the ballot number in leaders may increase after a 1a or 2a message is sent. The fix of having acceptors detect preemption and inform the leader also makes the algorithm much more efficient in the case of preemption upon receiving 1a messages: a simple preempt message is sent instead of a 1b message with an entire accepted set.
The earlier incorrect version was used in distributed algorithms and distributed systems courses for several years, with dozens of course projects and homeworks having used it, including ones directed specifically at testing and even modeling using TLA+ and model checking using TLC [Mic16] . However, this safety violation was never found, because it requires delays of many messages, extremely unlikely to be found by testing or model checking.
Related work and conclusion
Paxos and its variants, especially including their specification and verification, have seen a long series of studies, as introduced in Section 1. van Renesse and Altinbuken's pseudocode [vRA15] is by far the most concise specification of a more realistic version of Paxos among existing works. For example, a specification of Raft in Verdi is reported to be 530 lines [WWA + 16]. Even Basic Paxos in various languages, e.g., IOA, Overlog, and Bloom, are 145-230 lines, as summarized previously [LSLG12] . Our specification is significantly simpler and captures the control flows and synchronization conditions at a higher level. It has helped tremendously in teaching and allowed us to easily discover the main liveness violation discussed. An earlier, incomplete specification [LSL12] has a similar liveness violation, and a delay in applying decisions by not using await.
The language we use is DistAlgo [LSLG12, LSL17] , presented concisely. It is high-level, as pseudocode languages or even English, precise, as specification languages, and executable, as programming languages. In particular, it is significantly higher-level and easier to read and write than conventional programming languages, including concise languages like Erlang and Python, and formal specification languages, such as PlusCal and IOA, as discussed previously [LSLG12] . DistAlgo has been implemented in Python [LSLG12] and given an operational semantics [LSL17] . Straightforward execution when message histories and high-level queries are used can be extremely inefficient; optimization by incrementalization generates efficient code that maintains query results incrementally as messages are sent and received [LSLG12, LSL17, LBSL16] .
Formal verification of Paxos has mostly been for Basic Paxos only or by model checking, as summarized previously [CLS16] . Model checking Paxos works for only a minimum number of processes and even just a single slot as in, e.g., DeMeter-MaceMC and DeMeter-MoDist [ 
A Mechanically checked proofs in TLAPS
We manually translated the specification of vRA Multi-Paxos in Figure 3 and the two extensions in Section 4 to TLA+. We specified and proved safety for three versions: vRA Multi-Paxos, vRA Multi-Paxos with state reduction, and vRA Multi-Paxos with state reduction and failure detection. The high-level nature of our DistAlgo specifications makes the translation relatively simple. We developed inductive proofs of safety for all three versions. The proofs, like the proof for Multi-Paxos from [CLS16] , are based on several invariants which together imply safety. The proofs involve three types of invariants: (1) type safety invariants, stating that as the system progresses, all data in the system have the expected types, (2) invariants about local data of processes, for example, about the values of ballot, accepted, and max_b, and (3) invariants about the global data of the system, in particular, about the messages sent in the system.
Our proofs for vRA Multi-Paxos differ from the proof for Multi-Paxos from [CLS16] for several reasons, including differences between the algorithms themselves. For example, the accepted set in vRA Multi-Paxos contains all triples for which a 2a message was sent and received and may contain a triple for which a 2b message was not sent, whereas in Multi-Paxos in [CLS16] , the accepted set would only keep a triple if a 2b message was sent containing that triple. Also, to keep our specification in TLA+ close to the specification in DistAlgo, we model ballots as tuples containing a natural number and a process ID, as opposed to modeling them as natural numbers as in [CLS16] . This modeling difference has huge impact on the proof, because comparison operators like > and ≥ on natural numbers are built-in operators in TLAPS, and it can reason about them automatically, but comparison operators on tuples need to be defined using predicates, and all of their properties, including fundamental properties like transitivity and non-commutativity, need to be explicitly stated in lemmas and proved. In addition, we specify and prove safety of three versions of Multi-Paxos, all of which are variations not considered in [CLS16] . Figure 4 presents the results about our specifications and proofs of vRA Multi-Paxos and its extensions, and the specifications and proofs of Multi-Paxos from [CLS16] and Basic Paxos from [LMD14] . First, we compare the specifications and proofs of vRA Multi-Paxos and its extensions with each other:
• The specification size grows by only 3 lines (1.9%) from 154 when we add state reduction, but by 60 more lines (38%), for the new actions added, when we add failure detection.
• The proof size grows by only 46 lines (0.9%) from 4959 when we add state reduction, but by 2001 more lines (40%) when we add failure detection, roughly proportional to the increase in specification size.
• The maximum level and degree of proof tree nodes remain unchanged when state reduction is added. When failure detection is added, the maximum level of proof tree nodes remains unchanged, but the maximum degree of proof tree nodes increases by 20 (71%), from 28 to 48, due to more complex proofs for the new actions added for failure detection.
• The specification of vRA Multi-Paxos, excluding comments, is 154 lines, which is 59% more. This increase is because our specification is intentionally kept very close to the specification in Figure 3 which models additional details.
• The proof of vRA Multi-Paxos, excluding comments, is 4959 lines, which is 380% more. This increase is due to many factors, including more actions (for sending 2a messages in two cases and for sending decisions), more invariants (about the looser accepted set and about program points for the additional actions), and representing ballots as tuples instead of natural numbers, as mentioned above.
• The proof tree for vRA Multi-Paxos is more complex, as shown by the 65% increase, from 17 to 28, in the maximum degree of proof tree nodes and 9% increase, from 11 to 12, in the maximum level of proof tree nodes.
• Twice as many lemmas are needed for vRA Multi-Paxos, 24 compared with 12, because properties of operations on tuples need to be explicitly stated in lemmas and proved, as mentioned above.
We prove 2 more continuity lemmas for vRA Multi-Paxos for the additional actions. The number of uses of continuity lemmas increases by 47 (162%), from 29 to 76, because of the additional actions and the larger number of invariants.
• The number of proofs by induction on set increment increases by 26 (650%), from 4 to 30, the number of proofs by contradiction increases from 1 to 14 (1300%), the number of obligations increases by 3405 (355%), from 959 to 4364, and the proof check time increases by 496 seconds (527%), from 94 seconds to 590 seconds, all due to increased complexity in the specification, more actions, and more invariants.
